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Abstract 
 
This article analyzes the effects of international trade policies on an imperfect 
competitive domestic market, taking into account not only consumers but also upstream and 
downstream firms. We first study the impact of a classic import tax decrease and we find that 
upstream firms are harmed and domestic fiscal revenues may decrease with such a policy. We 
then look at the effect of an increase in non-tariff barriers, seen as the lowest degree of 
substitutability between the domestic good and the imported good. The result is an 
improvement in each agent’s situation, since international competition becomes less fierce. 
Last, we show that market conditions may exist such that a coupled policy (import tax 
decrease and non-tariff barrier increase) makes every agent better off. This can explain why 
we observe a proliferation of domestic standards at national level in order to back up lower 
tariff negotiations by governments. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Over the last few decades we have observed two developments in trade policy that at 
first sight seem contradictory to the goals assigned to the World Trade Organization (see 
WTO, [13]). According to Yu [14]: 
 
“One of the most striking features of the trade policies of many industrialized nations is 
the apparent substitution of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) for tariffs. During the past three decades, 
tariffs have undergone continuous reduction while, at the same time, various NTBs have been 
adopted.” 
 
Indeed, Beghin [3] obverses lower tariffs (3% in high-income countries) on the one 
hand whereas there is a proliferation of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on the other. Common 
NTBs include market-specific trade and domestic policies such as rules of origin and 
domestic content requirement schemes (for example labeling and certification policies such as 
the European Union Geographic Indication system) that are specifically classified as technical 
barriers to trade (TBT). Labeling that communicates the origin of products is becoming 
prominent in the agrofood sector (Anders and Caswell, [1]). 
The use of NTBs, other than quantity-price controls and finance measures, increased 
from 55% of all NTB measures in 1994 to 85% in 2004. The use of TBTs almost doubled, 
from 32% to 59% of affected tariff lines over the same period (Beghin, [4]). The evolution of 
the NTBs is more qualitative because it is difficult to translate its effects in terms of tax 
equivalent. It is indeed crucial to assess welfare losses imputable to implementation of NTBs. 
For this reason, the OECD [8] discussed the different methods that have been used to quantify 
the impact of product standards on trade, and more precisely on welfare. 
 
The general opinion about trade policy is that the decrease in tariffs has led to more 
exchanges between countries, and has thus improved social welfare. This is based on the 
classic Ricardo and Hecksher-Ohlin models which assume perfect competition in both 
countries trading their goods. However, it is important to relax this assumption and analyze 
the trade policy reform taking into account imperfect competition as well as market structure. 
According to Krugman-Obstfled [5], governments prefer to negotiate tariff decreases rather 
than non-tariff decreases. This suggests that their effects are not the same on the domestic 
economy, notably on agent’s surplus. 
 The second point is that imperfect competition has an impact on trade policy 
implementation. Regarding vertical structures (upstream and downstream firms), economic 
analysis has focused on the foreclosure issue. Domestic upstream firms can evict new 
suppliers coming from abroad by adapting their contracts with the downstream firms, 
especially when local anti-trust authorities are lenient, as in Avenel & Barlet [2]  or Spencer 
& Jones [11, 12]. 
 
 In this article, we focus on the effect of trade policy reform, taking into account a 
simple vertical structure composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. In order to analyze trade 
policy correctly, tariff and non-tariff barriers are disentangled. The tariff is assumed to be an 
import tax rate that the retailer pays when he buys from the World Market, whereas we model 
the non-tariff barriers as a proxy for the degree of substitutability between the domestic good 
and the imported good. 
 
We first find that a trade reform only aimed at decreasing the import tax rate is not 
accepted by all agents, especially upstream firms. However, any increase in NTBs is accepted 
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by everyone since domestic competition between goods is reduced. The main conclusion is 
that an implementation of NTBs can overcome the reluctance of agents harmed by a lower 
tariff, so that everyone is better off. This can explain stylized facts where we observe a 
proliferation of domestic standards (TBTs) at national level in order to back up lower tariffs 
resulting from governments’ negotiations. 
 Our article is a positive economic paper in the sense that it tries to explain the conflicts 
of interests in a simple economy that arises from the trade policy reform, distinguishing trade 
obstacles by nature (tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers) as well as market structure 
complexity (upstream and downstream conflict of interests). 
 
 Section 2 presents the framework we use to analyze the trade policy reform. Section 3 
exhibits the market equilibrium with a producer-retailer vertical structure and section 4 
analyzes the consequence of various trade policy reforms. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. The framework 
 
We consider a vertical structure composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. 
Manufacturer  produces a good domestically with a quadratic cost function: () = , 
where q is the quantity level and c a cost parameter. His production can be sold on two 
markets. First, he sells part of his production (qD) to a domestic retailer 	
.
1
 The retailer incurs 
no cost for his activities and sells the good to final consumers at price 
. We assume a two-
part tariff contract between the manufacturer and the retailer, where the wholesale price  
and the franchise fee  are fixed according to a Nash Axiomatic framework.2 The parameter  denotes the manufacturer’s bargaining power, and (1 − ) that of the retailer. Second, the 
manufacturer can also sell part of his production () on the "World Market". This 
supranational market is assumed to be perfectly competitive. This implies that the 
manufacturer is anonymous on this market and not big enough to influence the World 
equilibrium price. He therefore acts as a price-taker agent. In this framework, we suppose 
there are no exportation taxes. Assuming the world price is exogenous and equal to , the 
manufacturer can export as many quantities as he wants (completely inelastic world demand); 
his revenues will thus be  ⋅ .  
 In the same way, the retailer has two supply sources. He can either buy from the 
domestic manufacturer, paying him the unit wholesale price and the franchise fee , or 
buy from the World market at the unit price . When importing, the retailer faces an ad-
valorem import tax set to  by the domestic State. Therefore, the final unit price paid by the 
retailer to import is (1 + ). The price charged to the consumers for the imported good is 
.  
 Consumers do not consider the domestic good and the imported good as perfect 
substitutes. This can be justified by the fact that when the good is sold by the retailer from the 
manufacturer’s domestic production, it can fulfill domestic standard requirements and be 
labeled differently from the imported good.3 Because the World market is supplied by many 
countries, the imported product may differ from the domestic good. The label allows 
consumers to distinguish the imported good from the domestic one. 
                                                 
1
 All variables relative to the domestic market will be denoted with a D superscript, the ones relative to the imported good 
will be denoted with the I subscript, and X will denote the variable relative to the exportation. 
2
 See the book by Osborne & Rubinstein [9] for a detailed presentation of the Nash negotiation game and its topological 
characteristics. 
3
 The cost of presenting the domestic production to the Domestic Standard Agency delivering the label is not formalized. 
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Demands for the domestic good (denoted q(p, p)) and for the imported good 
(denoted q(p, p)) are derived from a quasi-linear and quadratic utility of a representative 
consumer.4 They are given by:  
(1) 
, 
 = 1 1! 11!2 ⋅ 
 !1!2 ⋅ 
	

, 
  1 1!
!
1!2
⋅ 
 1
1!2
⋅ 

          
 
 The parameter   is a measure of the market size for the total demand. 5 The parameter 
! summarizes the NTBs by reflecting the degree of differentiation between the two goods: 
when ! → 0, goods are independent: the demand for the domestic good (resp. imported good) 
depends only on its own price, and when ! → 1 goods tend to be considered as perfect 
substitutes by consumers.6 This parameter can also be interpreted as the strength of the 
standard for consumers. If the standard obtained by the domestic good is not relevant for 
consumers, they will consider the two goods as close substitutes. Conversely, when 
consumers care about the domestic label, the two goods are independent. One can also think 
of compatibility issues where the domestic good and the imported good may not be fully 
compatible to be used on a given device (see Régibeau and Rocketty, [10]). 
 
The framework is summarized in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: The economic framework with vertical structure. 
 
We now turn to the negotiation process and solve the equilibrium wholesale price and 
franchise fee between the manufacturer and the retailer.  
 
 
                                                 
4 The consumer’s utility function is assumed to take the form: Uq', q, q  1  αq 	1  αq  ) 	*q
  βqq 	q,  q' 
where q' is the Hicksian composite commodity with a price normalized to 1. 
5 The interpretation of α as the market size parameter in the comparative static analysis has to be considered for a given level 
of β, see Irmen [6] for more details. 
6 For example, country-of-origin labeling (COOL) is a horizontal product characteristic. 
Third-party Countries’ Exports 
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3. Market equilibrium with the vertical structure 
 
The manufacturer and the retailer negotiate the level of the domestic product’s 
wholesale price and the associated franchise fee. As we assumed this negotiation was taking 
place according to a Nash Axiomatic framework, we first need to consider the disagreement 
equilibrium. It constitutes the threat points of the negotiation and gives the profit each agent 
will make if the negotiation on the domestic product fails.  
  
We first define each agent’s reservation profit in the case where the manufacturer and 
the retailer do not reach an agreement (see Appendix A for more details of the resolution). 
The manufacturer sells all his production to the World market (pure exportations) while the 
retailer buys exclusively from the World market and pays import tariff. The reservation 
profits are: 
(2) - ./ = 01.	 = 14 (1 +  − (1 + ))2 
 
We now turn to the case where the retailer and the manufacturer negotiate in order to 
find an agreement for selling the domestic product. The gross surplus (GS) of the two 
products is thus defined by (see Appendix B for more details of the resolution):  
(3) 34(!, ) = (
 − (1 + )) ⋅ (
, 
) + 
 ⋅ (
 , 
) +  ⋅  −  (56758(98,9:))1  
 
The net surplus (;4) necessary to find an agreement takes into account each firm’s 
threat point, that is:  
(4) ;4∗(!, ) = 34(!, ) − ./ − .= = (()7>)()?@)70()7A)@?0)1B()?@1) > 0 
 
The wholesale price is set to the equilibrium marginal cost ∗ =  and the franchise 
fee is only used to split the net surplus between each agent according to their bargaining 
power parameter: πM*(β,t)=γ⋅NS*(β,t)+πM and πR*(β,t)=(1-γ)⋅NS*(β,t)+πR.  
At the end, each one gets:  
(5)           ./∗(!, ) =  ((1+ )(1−!)+(1+)!−)
24(1−!2) + 01.=∗(!, ) = (1 − ) ((1+ )(1−!)+(1+)!−)24(1−!2) + )B (1 +  −(1 + )) 
 
The equilibrium outcome values for prices are:  
(6) -
∗() = ) 1 +  + (1 + )	
∗() = ) (1 +  + )			 		 
 
The equilibrium outcome values in quantities are:  
(7)         
MNO
NP ∗(!, ) = ()7>)()?@)?0()?Q)?0R	()?@1) 	∗(!, ) = ()7>)()?@)?0()?Q)70QR	()?@1)qS∗(β, t) = )B TBUV − UR)?Q+ U(7R)?()7W))7Q X
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The domestic government, when both goods are sold, benefits from fiscal revenues 
up-to:  
(8) 3∗(!, ) = ∗(
∗) = 0A[()7>)()?@)?0()7A?@)]()?@1)  
 
The first remark concerns the fiscal revenues of the domestic government. The import 
tax needs to be not too high in order to have positive fiscal revenues. The limit tax value is 
thus defined by:7  
(9)               3∗(!, ) = 0 ⇒ (!) = (1+ −)(1−!) > 0 
The second remark is that the domestic sales are greater than the imported ones. This 
is quite trivial as the retailer pays ∗ =  for each domestic unit whereas he pays (1 + ) 
for the imported ones.  
 The third remark is that the total quantity produced by the manufacturer does not 
depend on the import taxes:
 
q∗ + qS∗ = UV . This is due to the equilibrium wholesale price set 
to ∗ = . The manufacturer earns the same unit revenue from export and from domestic 
sales. Therefore, the total quantity produced is decided according to marginal cost, which 
depends on the opportunity cost of the world market price.  
 
The equilibrium strategies for the manufacturer and the retailer are to find an 
agreement in order to be able to sell both goods on the domestic market and enjoy the 
monopoly outcome. This monopoly outcome is then split between them in the vertical 
structure according to their respective bargaining strength. Note here that an agreement is 
always found as the net surplus to be split is strictly positive. Therefore, the disagreement 
outcome where the manufacturer only exports and the retailer only imports is not 
implemented at the equilibrium. It is only a threat point for each agent in the negotiation, 
allowing them to secure some minimal profit. 
 
 We now analyze the effects of a trade policy reform on the domestic economy. 
According to observed facts, such a policy consists in lowering the import tax and/or in 
increasing the non-tariff barriers, translating into less substitutatibility between products. The 
next section will consider the impact of the trade policy reforms on the market, and its 
consequences on the agents’ profits. 
 
 
4. The effects of trade policy reforms 
 
 We first analyze the effects of a decrease in the import tax on each agent’s surplus. We 
then turn to the analysis of the impact of a modification of label requirements affecting the 
substitution parameter. Last, we look at how these different trade policy tools may be 
combined to create a broad consensus among economic actors. 
 
4.1 Import tariff reform 
 
A decrease in the tax translates into a lower domestic good production and an increase 
in the quantity of the imported good. However, total quantity sold on the market rises because 
of a less harmful deadweight loss created by the taxation. 
                                                 
7
 Note that demands are positive as soon as  < (!). 
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Trade liberalization by lowering the import tariff has often been judged as welfare 
improving. This is beneficial because it stimulates competition across firms and thus 
international trade may achieve an efficient allocation of production across countries. Besides, 
trade liberalization favors product diversity for consumers. However, in our framework, 
lowering the import tariff does not benefit the vertical structure surplus.  
 
Proposition 1. Lowering the import tariff decreases the net surplus to be split in the 
negotiation between the manufacturer and the retailer. The manufacturer will not benefit 
from a tariff decrease, whereas the retailer’s profit will increase. 
 
Proof:  
The derivative of the net surplus of the negotiation (eq. 4) according to t leads to: 
 
∂;4∗(!,)∂ = !((1+ )(1−!)+(1+)!−)2(1−!2) > 0  
 This derivative is always positive, indicating that the net surplus decreases when  is 
reduced. 
As the manufacturer’s profit is defined by ./∗(!, ) = ;4∗(!, ) + 01 , and ;4∗(!, ) is decreasing when  decreases, ./∗(!, ) also decreases whatever his bargaining 
power.  
The retailer’s profit is: .=∗() = (1 − );4∗() + )B (1 +  − (1 + )). So:  ∂.	∗(!,)∂ < 0				for				 < (1+ −)(1−!)(1+!)(1−!2)   
As  is only relevant in [0, ] and because )7@b)?@1b > 1, we have ()7>?0)()?@)()7@b)0()?@1b) > . 
Therefore, the retailer’s profit is always increasing as long as  decreases in [0, ]. 
        
 
Equation (10) summarizes the different effects of a tariff decrease in the vertical 
structure net surplus.  
(10) ;4(c↓ )efg↓ = [

 −(1 + )]ehhhhhfhhhhhg↑ + 
efg↓ +j↑ −  (58756)1ehfhg~ − .l~ − .	l↑  
 
 The import tariff decrease lowers the price of the imported good and its demand rises. 
But since the price decreases at a lower rate than the cost of the imported good (see eq. (6)), 
the retailer’s margin on the imported good thus increases. Therefore, the retailer’s profit 
earned on the imported good increases.8 Regarding the domestic product, a decrease in  
makes the domestic quantities sold by the manufacturer fall, and as the final price does not 
change, domestic sales decrease (see eq. (6) and (7)). Besides, as the manufacturer keeps his 
total production constant, the quantities he exports to the World market increase due to the 
loss in domestic demand. The last effect of the tariff decrease concerns the threat points of the 
manufacturer and the retailer, given in equation (2). Whereas the manufacturer’s reservation 
profit remains constant, the retailer has a higher disagreement pay-off as the imported good 
becomes cheaper.  
 
The retailer’s profit increases because the gain on his outside option overrides the 
lower share he gets from the vertical structure splitting. Indeed, the imported good becomes 
                                                 
8Profit on the imported good is defined by (
 − (1 + )) ⋅ . 
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cheaper and this plays to his advantage in the negotiation with the manufacturer. Conversely, 
the manufacturer’s loss is not compensated for by any modification of his reservation profit, 
and the reform therefore directly translates into a fall in the producer’s profits. 
 
 This conflict of interest in the vertical structure can shed some light on why producers 
are often reluctant about trade policy reform. In fact, their own incentives are clearly against 
trade liberalization as the retailer becomes more independent from their domestic production. 
This forces manufacturers to leave them more rents in order to find an agreement on the 
commercialization of the domestic good. Additionally, the trade policy reform fails to provide 
these two partners with a larger cake to split. 
 The domestic government may benefit or not from the trade policy reform, depending 
on the goal it wants to achieve. Its fiscal revenues 3∗() are maximum for a level ̃ =()7>?0)()?@)0 < . Therefore, if the initial tax rate is above ̃, the decrease in the import tariff 
makes fiscal revenues higher, but if the initial tax rate is below ̃ the domestic government 
loses on fiscal entries. Depending on the initial tax rate level, a government attentive to fiscal 
revenues may be reluctant to ratify a trade policy reform despite the increase in social welfare. 
 
4.2 Effect of non-tariff barriers 
 
 In previous decades, governments used to negotiate substantial import tax reductions 
whereas now, trade policy reforms mainly focus on the removal of ‘non-tariff barriers. For 
instance, we can argue that the standard obtained by the domestic good (such as a 
geographical indication) or weak compatibility between the domestic and the imported good 
is a non-tariff barrier as advocated by Marette and Beghin [7]. This standard allows the 
domestic good not to be considered at the same competition level as the imported one by 
consumers. In our framework, when the horizontal differentiation parameter (!) decreases, 
the two goods become less and less of a substitute for the consumers. This can be interpreted 
as the result of higher consumer loyalty to the domestic standard. 
 
Proposition 2. When non tariff barriers increase, it results in a higher net surplus to be split 
in the vertical structure. The profits of the manufacturer and the retailer increase. 
 
Proof:   
The derivative of the net surplus to be split between  and 	 is: 
 
∂;4∗(!,)∂! = (t−)(t	!+)2(1−!2)2 < 0				ℎop				0 <  <  
 
As the substitution parameter does not play a part in the reservation profits, it is 
straightforward that both ./∗ and .=∗ decrease with respect to !.           
 
Equation (11) summarizes the different effects of an increase in NTBs (! decreases) in 
the vertical structure net surplus.  
(11) NS(βc)↓efg↑
= [p − w(1 + t)]qehhhhfhhhhg↑ + pqefg↑	rs	RtRu	+ wqSj↓		rs	RtRuehhhfhhhg↑	rs	RtRu
− c (wx7wy)1ehfhgz − π{lz − π|lz 	where	ť = )?Q)7Q1 	t < t 
 
When the two products become more differentiated, the net surplus to be split in the 
vertical structure is greater. Both agents in the vertical structure are thus inclined to  
strengthen non-tariff barriers. The reduced competition between goods resulting from the 
domestic standard enforcement drives up the retailer’s profits on the imported good. The 
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revenue effect of total production (domestic and exports) depends on the level of the import 
tax. 
 The domestic government gains on fiscal revenues as ∗ increases with NTBs. A 
policy aimed at the proliferation of NTBs is a way for the government to increase fiscal 
revenues all the easier since all agents in the economy will benefit from it. This result could 
explain why we observe the implementation of an increasing number of NTBs at national 
levels in high-income countries (see Beghin, [4] or Anders and Caswell, [1]). 
 
4.3 Coupled trade policy reform 
 
 In previous decades, trade policy reform consisted, principally, in negotiating inter-
state agreements on reducing tariff import taxes. However, this policy was not supported by 
local manufacturers, whereas the increase in NTBs benefits everyone in the economy. 
Therefore, this may explain why governments reinforce NTBs in order to back up a targeted 
decrease in import taxes. The remaining question is to know whether there exists a coupled 
trade policy reform that makes everyone better off? 
 
Proposition 3. There exist market conditions such that an import tax decrease and an 
increase in NTBs are supported by every agent. 
 
Proof: The following table summarizes each agent’s profit variation according to the trade 
policy tool used. 
 
Agent Decrease in the import tax	 Increase in NTBs Decrease in import tax and increase in NTBs (	 ↓ 				 ↓ ) 
Manufacturer ↘ ↗ ↗ 				if				 ∂t∂β > 	 ̅ − !	(1 − !) 
Retailer ↗ ↗ ↗ 
Consumers ↗ ↗ ↗ 
Domestic 
State 
↘ if	initial	tax < ̃	 ↗ if	initial	tax > ̃	 ↗ ↗ 				if				 ∂t∂β > 	 ((1 − !)̅ + !)(1 − !)(̅ − )  
Social 
Welfare ↗ ↗ ↗ 
Table 1. Variation in agents’ profits with respect to  and . 
 
 One can see that if   RQ >   A̅?A@	()?@1) ; A(()?@)A̅7@A)()?@1)(A̅?A) 	, then a coupled trade policy is 
Pareto-improving since reluctance about the decrease in tariffs can always be compensated for 
by higher non-tariff barriers in order to please the domestic State and the manufacturer.        
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5. Conclusion 
 
 This model reveals the potential conflict of interest between upstream and downstream 
firms by taking into account the vertical structure which would have remained in the shadow 
otherwise. A trade policy aiming to decrease the import tax will favor the reserve profit the 
retailer secures in his negotiation with the manufacturer on the domestic good. Moreover, the 
development of NTBs has mainly been justified by the improvement in market efficiency 
such as  increased information on products in the case of labeling. Our model stresses the fact 
that, by strengthening the domestic standard, NTBs increase each agent’s interest. 
 Another conclusion is that governments wanting to implement targeted tariff decreases 
may also increase NTBs in order to gain manufacturers’ support and create a broad consensus 
within political forces. 
 
 There are however limits to this article’s conclusions. One of them concerns 
downstream competition. In our framework, the retailer has a monopoly on both goods sold to 
consumers. This absence of competition makes the NTBs increase, resulting in a higher 
consumers’ surplus since the retailer perfectly internalizes interbrand substitutatibility (prices 
unchanged). Taking into account retailers’ competition could lead to higher prices when 
goods become less of a substitute, and thus to lower social welfare. It could jeopardize the 
broad consensus on the coupled policy trade reform. Moreover, it could also be thought that 
fiscal revenues may be used to pay for costly label implementation. A modification of the 
substitution parameter between products due to a strengthening of the domestic label may also 
impact on manufacturers’ production costs, making them reluctant to support an increase in 
NTBs. 
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APPENDIX A  
Determination of the reservation profits 
 
When the manufacturer and the retailer do not find an agreement on the wholesale price and 
the franchise fee, the retailer only proposes the imported good to consumers. In this case, the 
demand for the imported good is given by:9  
 (+∞, 
) = (1+ )− 
  
 
The manufacturer produces in order to equal marginal revenue to marginal cost, that is such 
that: ′(∗) =  ⇔ ∗ =   
This production gives him a reservation profit equal to:  . = 22  
 
The retailer maximizes his profit: .	(
) = (
−(1+ )) ⋅ (+∞,
) 
 
This leads him to set the price of the imported good to:  
() = 12 1+ +(1+ ) 
achieving a reservation profit of  .	 = 14 (1+ −(1+ ))2. 
 
The domestic government, recovering the import taxes, gets a fiscal revenue equal to:  3 =  ⋅  ⋅  = 12(1+ −(1+ )) 
This fiscal revenue is positive as long as  <	 )7>)7A . 
 
                                                 
9
 The ∞ symbol is used to denote the absence of the domestic good, as if the domestic good price was so high 
that no consumer would buy it. This demand is found by replacing in (1) the price 
 by the limit price 
cancelling the  domestic demand:  
lim = (1 − !)(1 +  ) + !
. 
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APPENDIX B  
Cooperative Nash negotiation resolution 
 
The joint objective function to be maximized is the one of an axiomatic Nash framework, that 
is, the gross surplus removed from the retailer and manufacturer’s reserve profits. The net 
surplus to be maximized jointly is thus the one computed using equations (9) and (10). The 
program is:  Max
,
,,, = *
−(1+ ), ⋅ 
, 
+
 ⋅ 
, 
 
− 14 (1 +  − (1 + )) +  ⋅  −

2 [(
 , 
) + ] −

2  
 
This leads to the following equilibrium: 

∗() = 12 (1 +  + (1 + ))    and    ∗(!, ) = (1 +  )(1 − !) − (1 +  − !) 2(1 − !2)  

∗() = 12 (1 +  + )    and    ∗(!, ) =
(1 +  )(1 − !) − *1 − !(1 + ), 
2(1 − !2)  
∗(!, ) = 14 4 − 1 − ! + (2 + ) − 2(1 +  )1 + !  
 
The wholesale domestic price set by the manufacturer is fixed to the marginal cost, in order to 
avoid any quantity distortion within the domestic vertical structure. The total production of 
the manufacturer is given by ∗ + ∗ = 0 . Due to the manufacturer’s quadratic cost 
structure, the marginal cost of the domestic product is, at the equilibrium: 
∗ = ∂ ⋅ ( + ∗)∂ =  ⋅ ( + ∗) =  
 
The franchise fee , paid by the retailer to the manufacturer, is then set to split the maximal 
equilibrium net surplus according to each agent bargaining power. It is defined such that:  
(
 − (1 + )) ⋅ (
 , 
) + (
 − ) ⋅ (
 , 
) −  = (1 − ) ⋅ ;4∗(!, ) + 14 (1 +  − (1 + )) 
where ;4∗(!, ) = (07()7>)()?@)70()7A)@)1B()?@1) . 
